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We study the effect of localized attacks on a multiplex spatial network, where each layer is a
network of communities. The system is considered functional when the nodes belong to the giant
component in all the multiplex layers. The communities are of linear size ζ, such that within them
any pair of nodes are linked with same probability, and additionally nodes in nearby communities are
linked with a different (typically smaller) probability. This model can represent an interdependent
infrastructure system of cities where within the city there are many links while between cities there
are fewer links. We develop an analytical method, similar to the finite element method applied
to a network with communities, and verify our analytical results by simulations. We find, both
by simulation and theory, that for different parameters of connectivity and spatiality — there is a
critical localized size of damage above which it will spread and the entire system will collapse.
In recent years, due to the advances in technology,
many systems have become more and more integrated
and interdependent. This dependence between these sys-
tems can cause a spread of damages, and lead to a cascade
of failures and even entire system collapse. Therefore,
many studies have been carried out to analyze cascad-
ing failures in interdependent networks [1–7]. Further,
in many real systems such as power grids and trans-
portation systems, the links are of typical relatively short
length due to the embedding in space. In such spatial
systems, the initial failures or attacks can be localized
to a specific region. Recent studies show that in differ-
ent cases of spatial interdependent networks, localized
attacks are significantly more damaging than random at-
tacks [8–11]. In addition, many real networks have a
modular structure, such as biological networks [12] and
many infrastructure systems [13, 14]. Therefore, recent
studies have explored and compared the robustness of
individual and interdependent modular non-spatial sys-
tems [15–18]. Our study combines for the first time, three
ubiquitous features of real complex systems — interde-
pendence, spatiality and modularity.
Here, we analyze and predict the resilience of spatial
multiplex networks with modular structure, see Fig. 1,
under localized attacks, by developing tools based on per-
colation theory. An example of a realistic system that
motivates our model is the infrastructure networks in a
country, where each layer describes different infrastruc-
ture. The different infrastructures are dependent on each
other, and in addition, each layer has high connections
within the cities and a few long connections between
nearby cities. We focus on localized failures because of
two main reasons. First, a localized damage is a realistic
scenario (due to flood or earthquake), and second, in such
systems, a finite number of local failures concentrated in
the same area might spread the damage throughout the
system and cause significant damage and even to fully
system collapse.
Model. Our model is generated as a multiplex system
FIG. 1: A schematic representation of the model.
The nodes are at the lattice sites of a two-dimensional square
lattice of size L× L with L = 15. The system is constructed
as m × m Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) networks. Here m = 3, where
each ER is of size ζ × ζ with ζ = 5. In each ER network the
links are between pairs of sites chosen at random, and there
are also links between nearby ER networks. The green and
blue lines represent the links in the first and second layer of
the multiplex. In our simulations we set periodic boundary
conditions, not shown for clarity.
with spatial and community properties, see Fig. 1. A
multiplex network is a single network with at least two
kinds of connectivity links. We assume here that the
two types of links serve for two different functions, such
as transportation and communication. In fact, a mul-
tiplex network with two kinds of connectivity links (for
instance) can be regarded as a special case of interdepen-
dent networks with two layers with the same number of
nodes, and every node in one layer has only one interde-
pendent link with a single node in the other layer. For
a node to remain functional in the multiplex, after the
percolation process [19, 20], it must be connected to the
giant component in both layers. This reflects the assump-
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FIG. 2: The critical attack size rch as a function of α
for different 〈ktotal〉 values. For every 〈ktotal〉 the lines
represent the theory of Eq. (10) and the symbols represent
simulation results. As seen, the simulations show excellent
agreement with the theory. For a given 〈ktotal〉, there is a
metastable region that starts above a certain critical αc. In
this region, rch is smaller then the system size and increases
only slightly with α. The figure suggests that for a certain
〈ktotal〉 one needs α above a critical αc to enable propagation
of a localized damage. Below αc one needs to remove order
of L2 nodes for the system to collapse. Above αc a finite
number of nodes (zero fraction) leads to system collapse. For
the simulations we set L = 2100 and ζ = 100, with average
over 5 runs for each data point.
tion that in order for a node in the system to function —
it requires both resources provided by the two layers.
Our multiplex model is composed here, for simplicity
and without loss of generalization, of two layers in which
the nodes are placed at sites of a square lattice of size
L × L. The multiplex is constructed as m × m Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi (ER) multiplex networks (communities), each of
which of size ζ × ζ, that are tiled and connected to each
other as a square lattice (see Fig. 1). We assume, that
the links within a community (intra-links) are connected
at random, while the links connecting nodes in two dis-
tinct communities (inter-links) can only connect neigh-
boring tiles. Each node has a degree 〈kinter〉 of inter-links
and a degree 〈kintra〉 of intra-links. The total degree is:
〈ktotal〉 = 〈kinter〉+ 〈kintra〉. In addition, the heterogene-
ity of the system is specified by the interconnectivity pa-
rameter α = 〈kinter〉/〈ktotal〉. It should be noted that the
homogeneous case (without communities) has been previ-
ously studied both for single-layer [21, 22] and multi-layer
[11, 23] networks. In that model, all links have a char-
acteristic length ζ with no distinction between inter and
intra links, and therefore representing an homogeneous
systems, without communities. In contrast, the present
new model can describe systems with a spatial structure
of communities, where the heterogeneity of the system is
controlled by the α parameter. Thus, this model enables
us to expand the previous model to a more general and
realistic one for systems such as interconnected cities.
Theory and Simulation Results. Here we develop a
framework for understanding the cascading process for a
general case of a multiplex network. The constrains are
that each layer has a spatial structure of communities
that are connected in a form of a lattice. The cascading
failures in multiplex networks is a process in which fail-
ures of some nodes lead to failures of other nodes and so
on. When the cascading failures stops we are left with
the mutual giant component (MGC) of the network. In
the cascading process, at first we remove all nodes that
are not in the giant component (GC) of the first layer.
Then, from the set of the remaining nodes, we remove all
the nodes that are not in the GC of the second layer. We
repeat this two steps until there are no nodes to remove,
and we are left with the MGC. The existence of a MGC
of volume O(N) where N is the number of nodes in the
network, expresses the functionality of the system.
In order to obtain analytically the size of the MGC,
we use a method similar to a finite element approach
[24] in which we introduce non-linear equations for each
community and for each intercommunity link treating the
entire system as a network of communities. We begin
with deriving equations for the size of the GC after a
percolation process in a single layer and precisely defining
the parameters of these equations. We assume that the
number of links kν,i,j linking any node ν in community i
to nodes in community j is statistically independent from
number kν,i,`, linking node ν to any other community `.
These numbers are randomly taken from a given degree
distributions Pi,j(k). We define the generating functions
of these distributions:
Gi,j(x) =
∑
k
Pi,j(k)x
k (1)
and the generating functions of the excess degree distri-
bution [25]:
Hi,j(x) =
∑
k
Pi,j(k)k
〈ki,j〉 x
k, (2)
where 〈ki,j〉 are the average degrees of distributions
Pi,j(k). We define fi,j as the chance that a link pass-
ing from a node in community i to a node in community
j does not lead to the GC. The link is an “intra-link” if i
is equal to j otherwise it is an “inter-link”. If we assume
that pj is the fraction of nodes survived in community j
after an initial attack or as a result of cascading process,
fi,j must satisfy recurrent equations:
fi,j = (1− pj) + pj ·Hj,i(fj,i) ·
∏
6`=i
Gj,`(fj,`), (3)
where the index ` goes over the set of neighboring com-
munities of community j including community j itself.
When ` = i, one of the links leading from a node in com-
munity j back to community i is used by an incoming
link, hence we must use the generating function of the
excess degree distribution. Finally, the fraction of nodes
in community i which belong to the GC is:
gi = pi
1−∏
j
Gi,j(fi,j)
 , (4)
iii
where the index j goes over the set of neighboring com-
munities of community i including community i itself. If
we introduce vectors ~f with components fi,j , ~p with com-
ponents pi and ~g with components gi, then Eq. (3) can
be written in a symbolic vector form:
~f = ~Φ(~f, ~p). (5)
This equation can be solved using the iteration method
starting with ~f = 0, and it will uniquely define the vector
~f(~p) as function of vector ~p. Analogously, Eq. (4) can be
presented in a vector form:
~g = ~Ψ(~f, ~p). (6)
For generality, we will assume that in Eq. (6) the vectors
~f and ~p, are two arbitrary vectors, independent of one
another.
Now we will obtain equations for the MGC of the mul-
tiplex. Suppose that the survival probability vector after
initial attack is ~p(0) with components pi(0), and the vec-
tor of survival probabilities after stage t of the cascade is
~p(t). In principle, for the layers of the multiplex A and B
the degree distributions can be different, and hence the
functions ~Φ and ~Ψ and the vectors ~f and ~g should be
different. Therefore, we will distinguish them by adding
indexes A and B. Using the same logic as in Ref. [1], the
equations of the cascade of failures starting from t = 0
will be:
~fA(2t) = ~ΦA[~fA(2t), ~p(2t)]
~gA(2t) = ~ΨA[~fA(2t), ~p(2t)]
~p(2t+ 1) = ~ΨA[~fA(2t), ~p(0)]
~fB(2t+ 1) = ~ΦB [~fB(2t+ 1), ~p(2t+ 1)]
~gB(2t+ 1) = ~ΨB [~fB(2t+ 1), ~p(2t+ 1)]
~p(2t+ 2) = ~ΨB [~fB(2t+ 1), ~p(0)],
(7)
where ~gA(t) and ~gB(t) are the fraction of nodes of each
community in the giant component at stage t and ~p(t) is
the effective fraction of survived nodes representing stage
t of the cascade of failures as a percolation process after
a random attack. As t→∞ the vectors ~gA(t) and ~gB(t)
will converge to the mutual giant component ~P∞.
If all distributions Pi,j(k) are Poisson distributions as
in ER graphs, then Gi,j(x) = Hi,j(x) = exp[〈ki,j〉(x−1)]
and all probabilities fi,j for the same community j but
different i satisfy the same equation and hence they must
be equal and we define fj ≡ fi,j . Thus, Eq. (3) and Eq.
(4) are significantly simplified and become respectively:
fj = (1− pj) + pj · e
∑
i〈ki,j〉·(fi−1) (8)
and
gj = pj(1− e
∑
i〈ki,j〉·(fi−1)). (9)
(a) (b)
(c)
FIG. 3: Analytical results — the dependence of the
critical attack size rch on the number of communities.
In (a) and (b) we show three behaviors of rch for α = 0.4 and
α = 0.8. The number of communities is m × m, therefore
the dependence on m expresses the dependence of rch on the
number of communities. For relatively small 〈ktotal〉, rch does
not depend on the number of communities. For intermediate
values of 〈ktotal〉, rch initially grows with m and then from a
certain m, reaches a stable value. This stable value oscillates
between two values of rch which correspond to even and odd
values of m. For large 〈ktotal〉 values, rch grows linearly with m
and is approximately 0.5m. In (c) we show (for m = 100) that
rch increases with 〈ktotal〉, when for α = 0.4 the transition is
sharper than for α = 0.8. This result brightens why the jump
in (a) larger than in (b).
From this follows that gj = (1 − fj) = 1 −
exp(−∑i〈ki,j〉gi). When the two layers of multiplex A
and B are with average degrees 〈ki,j〉A, and 〈ki,j〉B re-
spectively, Eqs. (7) give:
P∞j = p0j · [1− exp(−
∑
i
〈ki,j〉AP∞i)]·
[1− exp(−
∑
i
〈ki,j〉BP∞i)],
(10)
which is a generalization of the mutual giant component
formula for a multiplex of homogeneous graphs given in
Eq. (40) of Ref. [3]. We find the numerical solution
of the system (10) by iterations starting from the initial
values P∞j = 1.
We next analyze the robustness of our community mul-
tiplex model with respect to localized attacks or failures.
To this end, we consider the case where all nodes within
iv
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FIG. 4: Analytical results — Phase diagram of the
critical attack size rch. Dependence of r
c
h on the average
degree 〈ktotal〉 and the interconnectivity parameter α. For the
phase diagrams in this figure, we sample with equal intervals
16 values for 〈ktotal〉 and 20 values for α. (a) Contour for
the phase diagram with m = 100. The color bar in the right
represents the size of rch in ζ units (in log scale). (b) Here we
show the same contour lines as in (a) for rch values for m = 100
and m = 150. We see that both m values give identical results
except for near to the border where rch ∼ 0.5L (in the last
contour line). For lower m values, the misfit of the contour
lines starts in lower values of rch.
a radius rh (radius-hole), from the center of the multi-
plex, are removed from the network. When m is an even
number, then the center of the multiplex is at the corner
of 4 neighboring ER communities, and else it is in the
center of one ER. Note that rh translates into the value
of pi(0) by counting the fraction of lattice sites outside
the hole of radius rh in the damaged communities. For
example, if the center of the hole is in the center of the
community i and rh < 1/2, pi(0) ≈ 1−pir2h, alternatively,
when the center is at the corner of the four communities
j, pj(0) ≈ 1 − pir2h/4 in each of the four damaged com-
munities.
We find for networks with different system parameters,
by simulations and theory, what is the critical radius rch
needed to cause a system collapse. We find the accurate
value of rch through a binary search, where increasing
or decreasing of the radius attack is determined by the
MGC size at the end of the cascading. At a given radius
attack rh, if the MGC size (after the cascading) remains
in order of the system size then we increase rh, and oth-
erwise – we decrease it. We define a threshold condi-
(a)
(b)
FIG. 5: The cascading failures near the critical point.
Propagation of a local damage with radius slightly above the
critical size rch. (a) The average distance from the center, 〈r〉,
of the nodes that fail at every iteration. The inset figure is an
illustration of the network. (b) The continuous lines represent
the size of P∞j , for 4 communities having different distances
d from the center (where the critical hole was removed), as a
function of time. The colors of the lines correspond to the col-
ors of the painted communities in the inset figure. The dotted
line shows the MGC size over the whole multiplex (
∑
j P∞j).
For the simulations we set L = 4500, ζ = 300, 〈ktotal〉 = 2.5
and α = 0.4. The critical size rch for this simulation, which
obtained through a binary search, is rch = 0.57 in ζ units.
tion for the MGC size, below which we assume that the
MGC is 0. For the numerical calculations of the theory
we set the threshold to be 10−12, and for the simula-
tions (after some tests) a fraction of 0.1 of the system
size seems to provide a good threshold condition. Fur-
thermore, for the numerical calculations we divide each
community into ζ2 of points. Thus, we can calculate nu-
merically with good approximation the fraction of nodes
that fail in each community for an attack rh. In addition,
since we study the case of a symmetrical two-dimensional
square lattice, for the theoretical calculations (using Eq.
(10)) we set 〈ki,j〉A and 〈ki,j〉B to be 〈kinter〉/4 for i 6= j.
We find that for a network with structure parameters
within a certain parameter range of L, ζ and 〈ktotal〉,
there are two regimes that are divided by a critical αc, see
Fig. 2. Hence, a different ratio α between 〈kinter〉 and
〈ktotal〉 — for a fixed 〈ktotal〉 — can completely change
the system’s resilience to localized attacks. For α > αc,
we have a metastable regime, where a finite size localized
attack larger than rch causes cascading failures, leading to
vsystem collapse. The critical radius rch in this regime, for
a given 〈ktotal〉, depends weakly on the interconnectivity
parameter α. Note that this metastable regime located in
the narrow interval of 〈ktotal〉 above kc ≈ 2.4554, where
kc is the critical average degree (independent of α) below
which the homogeneous ER multiplex collapses without
any initial damage [1]. In order to interpret our model as
a model of a real infrastructure, we must assume that the
infrastructure is designed to be as economical as possible:
i.e. 〈ktotal〉 is minimized in a such a way that the mul-
tiplex retains the mutual giant component. Moreover,
we assume that the initial state of the system before the
localized attack is the MGC of the multiplex with given
initial 〈ktotal〉. Since in the mutual percolation, the fi-
nal state of the system does not depend on the order in
which the damage was made, the final result is the same
as if the localized attack was produced simultaneously
with the creation of the multiplex as given by Eqs. (7).
Remarkably, in this metastable regime networks with the
same 〈ktotal〉 but larger interconnectivity ratio α are more
vulnerable to localized attacks than networks with small
α where the communities are not well connected, but
more self-sufficient. Moreover, in this metastable regime,
rch is independent of the number of communities (Fig.
3). In marked contrast, for α < αc, the critical attack
rch is ∼ 0.5m in ζ units. Namely, the system remains
functioning for any attack that is less than removing the
entire system. In addition, we obtain numerically based
on Eq. (10) a phase diagram of rch, for a large system
with m = 100 in Fig. 4 (a). The phase diagram is the
same for different m values, see for instance Fig. 4 (b),
except for rch that are in the order of the system size.
As we noted above, the initial state of the system must
be understood as the MGC obtained for given 〈ktotal〉
before the localized attack. Therefore, to understand
how the damage produced by the localized attack spreads
with time, we first produce the cascade of failures with
pi(0) = 1. After this cascade stops we produce the lo-
calized attack of a given radius rch. For example, for
the simulations in Fig. 5 we perform the attack on step
time = 19. After the attack, there is a long latent period
during which only a few nodes fail at every time step,
and they are located mostly in the vicinity of the attack
area. Then, the damage quickly spreads until it reaches
the edges of the system. The spreading process explains
why the attack size does not depend on the system size.
Discussion. Typically, real-world engineered systems
are designed to be as efficient and cost effective as possi-
ble. Therefore, such systems are slightly above the criti-
cal state, and hence, these systems are very vulnerable to
various local failures. Here we have investigated the sta-
bility of realistic interdependent networks, consisting of
interconnected communities embedded in space, against
local failures. We develop a theory for calculating the
magnitude of the critical damage needed to destroy the
entire system for different parameters of connectivity and
spatiality. Our approach is similar to the finite element
method which is applied here to the network of commu-
nities, where each community is treated as an element,
participating in a system of equations. We find that for
the same 〈ktotal〉 (and, hence, the same cost) the networks
with low interconnectivity α are more robust against lo-
calized attacks than the system in which the communities
are well connected. If α is large, the damage produced
by the localized attack spreads over the entire system.
For small α, the damage does not spread. Thus, the in-
terlinks connecting neighboring communities could serve
as vehicles of damage propagation rather than for stabi-
lizing the system. This finding explains why islanding,
the strategy employed the electrical engineers by divid-
ing the system into almost isolated self-sustained islands
is an efficient strategy against cascading failures in the
power grid. In addition, we study the dynamical process
of cascading and find a long latent period during which
the number of failed nodes is very small and they are
localized close to the initial attack. During this period,
a relatively small intervention by reinforcing a few nodes
can stop the propagation of the cascade of failures. Af-
ter the latent period is over, the damage quickly spreads
over the entire system and there is no economic way to
stop it.
Acknowledgement. We thank the Italian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation jointly
with the Israeli Ministry of Science, Technology, and
Space (MOST); the Israel Science Foundation, ONR, the
Japan Science Foundation with MOST, BSF-NSF, ARO,
the BIU Center for Research in Applied Cryptography
and Cyber Security, and DTRA (Grant no. HDTRA-1-
14-1-0017) for financial support. D. V. thanks the PBC
of the Council for Higher Education of Israel for the Fel-
lowship Grant.
[1] Buldyrev, S. V. et al. Catastrophic cascade of failures in
interdependent networks. Nature 464, 1025–1028 (2010).
[2] Parshani, R., Buldyrev, S. V. & Havlin, S. Interdepen-
dent Networks: Reducing the Coupling Strength Leads
to a Change from a First to Second Order Percolation
Transition. Phys. Rev. Lett. 105, 048701 (2010).
[3] Gao, J. et al. Robustness of a network formed by n inter-
dependent networks with a one-to-one correspondence of
dependent nodes. Phys. Rev. E 85, 066134 (2012).
[4] Baxter, G. J. et al. Avalanche collapse of interdependent
networks. Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 248701 (2012).
[5] De Domenico, M. et al. Mathematical formulation of
multilayer networks. Phys. Rev. X 3, 041022 (2013).
[6] Bianconi, G. Statistical mechanics of multiplex networks:
Entropy and overlap. Phys. Rev. E 87, 062806 (2013).
[7] Son, S.-W. et al. Percolation theory on interdepen-
dent networks based on epidemic spreading. EPL (Euro-
physics Letters) 97, 16006 (2012).
vi
[8] Li, W. et al. Cascading Failures in Interdependent Lat-
tice Networks: The Critical Role of the Length of Depen-
dency Links. Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 228702 (2012).
[9] Berezin, Y. et al. Localized attacks on spatially embed-
ded networks with dependencies. Scientific Reports 5
(2015).
[10] Shao, S. et al. Percolation of localized attack on complex
networks. New Journal of Physics 17, 023049 (2015).
[11] Vaknin, D., Danziger, M. M. & Havlin, S. Spreading
of localized attacks in spatial multiplex networks. New
Journal of Physics 19, 073037 (2017).
[12] Bullmore, E. & Sporns, O. The economy of brain network
organization. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 13, 336–349
(2012).
[13] Eriksen, K. A. et al. Modularity and extreme edges of
the internet. Phys. Rev. Lett. 90, 148701 (2003).
[14] Guimera`, R. et al. The worldwide air transporta-
tion network: Anomalous centrality, community struc-
ture, and cities’ global roles. Proceedings of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences 102, 7794–7799 (2005).
https://www.pnas.org/content/102/22/7794.full.pdf.
[15] Bagrow, J. P., Lehmann, S. & Ahn, Y.-Y. Robustness
and modular structure in networks. Network Science 3,
509525 (2015).
[16] Shekhtman, L. M., Shai, S. & Havlin, S. Resilience of net-
works formed of interdependent modular networks. New
Journal of Physics 17, 123007 (2015).
[17] Dong, G. et al. Resilience of networks with
community structure behaves as if under an
external field. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 115, 6911–6915 (2018).
https://www.pnas.org/content/115/27/6911.full.pdf.
[18] Gross, B. et al. Interconnections between networks act
like an external field in first-order percolation transitions.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.07009 (2019).
[19] Stauffer, D. & Aharony, A. Introduction to Percolation
Theory (Taylor & Francis, 1994).
[20] Bunde, A. & Havlin, S. Fractals and disordered systems
(Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., 1991).
[21] Gross, B. et al. Multi-Universality and Lo-
calized Attacks in Spatially Embedded Networks.
http://journals.jps.jp/doi/pdf/10.7566/JPSCP.16.011002.
[22] Bonamassa, I. et al. Critical stretching of mean-field
regimes in spatial networks. Phys. Rev. Lett. 123, 088301
(2019).
[23] Danziger, M. M. et al. The effect of spatiality on mul-
tiplex networks. EPL (Europhysics Letters) 115, 36002
(2016).
[24] Brenner, S. & Scott, R. The mathematical theory of finite
element methods, vol. 15 (Springer Science & Business
Media, 2007).
[25] Newman, M. E. J. The Structure and Function of Com-
plex Networks. SIAM Review 45, 167–256 (2003).
